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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff and Apellant, 
vs. 
OP AL JOHNSON, individually and 
as Administratrix of the Estate of 
Cl~-de W. Johnson, deceased, 
Drf endant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11159 
BRIEF O,F APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be ref erred to as they appeared in 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff commenced this suit to cancel a policy of 
insurance obtained by false and fraudulent representa-
tions. Defendant counterclaimed for recovery of insur-
ance benefits under the policy. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint an<l 
awarded judgment on the counterclaim. 
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RELIEF ROUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order reversing the judgment of 
the trial court, directing judgment on plaintiff's complaint 
and dismissing the counterclaim or, in the alternative, 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff commenced this suit to cancel a policy of 
insurance issued to Clyde W. Johnson in September, 
1965. The action is grounded upon the contention that 
the policy was obtained by false and fraudulent repre-
sentations. Clyde W. Johnson and his survivors claim 
death benefits and hospital and mrdical benefits under 
the policy. Defendant counterclaimed for recovery of 
these benefits. 
There is no material conflict as to the facts of the 
case. The pre-trial order sets forth the uncontroverted 
facts and the contentions of the parties (R. 48-50). The 
trial court adopted by reference the entire statement of 
unconroverted facts as a part of his findings of fact (R. 
56). 
The cause was tried non-jury and the testimony of 
witnesses was offered by the respective parties to sup-
plement the statement of uncontroverted facts. The de-
fendant concedes that the insured Clyde \V. .Johnson 
falselv answered concerning his health in the application 
for i~surance. The principal defense asserted was that 
the plaintiff had issued two prior policies to the insured, 
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each of which contained certain "incontestable" clause:,; 
and that the clauses of the prior policies should bar the 
plaintiff's action for cancellation of the policy in ques-
tion. 
The trial court by his memorandum decision and by 
his conclusions of law held that the "incontestable" pro-
visions contained in the earlier policies "carried over 
and became effective provisions of the policy issued on 
fleptember 3, 1965, WP2 510 001 and, therefore, the 
benefits under said policy were in full force and effect." 
On or about October 17, 1957, the plaintiff's insur-
ance agent, Mr. Niles M. Wing, received an application 
from Mr. Johnson pursuant to which a policy of in-
surance was issued. This policy, known as an Employer's 
Security Policy, provided certain health, hospital and 
surgical benefits. One eligibility requirement for the is-
suance of the policy was that the policy be issued to an 
Pmployer of at least three persons. Mr. Johnson later 
became ineligible for this coverage because of a reduc-
tion in the number of employees retained by him. The 
coverage of the first policy was therefore cancelled in 
1960 (Tr. 32). 
Upon the reconunendation of Mr. Wing, a new polic.v 
was issued February 2, 1960. The new policy, known as 
a Gibraltar 325 policy, provided health, hospital and 
surgical benefits. It did not provide any life insurance 
or major medical coverage (Tr. 32-33). This policy re-
mained in force until the policy now in question wa::. 
issued by the plaintiff. 
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In the spring of 1965, Mr. Johnson's firm was em-
ploying sufficient employees to again qualify for an 
Employer's Security Policy. As Mr. Johnson's insurance 
agent, Mr. -Wing contacted ,Johnson and suggested to 
him that he consider taking out the Employer's Security 
Policy. The basis for the recommendation was that the 
new policy would provide life insurance coverage, and 
would also provide major medical expense which would 
take care of catastrophe-type sickness or accident (Tr. 
34). Application for the new policy was made Septem-
ber 3, 1965 and the policy was issued by Prudential pur-
suant to this application. 
At the time the new application was made, the agent 
explained to J olmson that this would be a ''brand new 
policy" (Tr. 46-4 7). 
Mr. Johnson's application was made on a form pro-
vided by the company (received in evidence as Exhibit 
2); was completed in the handwriting of the company's 
agent, Niles M. Wing, and was signed by Mr. Johnson 
in the presence of the agent. As a part of the taking of 
the application, the agent read to Mr. Johnson the fol-
lowing questions to which Mr. Johnson answered as fol-
lows (Part II, Paragraph 2(a), (b), (c) and (d)): 
(a) Have you at any time been treated for 
or heen told you had trouble with any of the 
following: .. : heart, high blood pressure .... 1 
Answer: No. 
(b) Have you been in any hospi~al or .other 
institution for observation, rest, diagnosis or 
treatment during the past five years~ 
Answer: No. 
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( c) Have you been examined by or consulted 
a physician during the past five years~ 
Answer: No. 
( d) Have you any known physical impair-
ments or ill health not covered by the answers 
through 2(a) to 2(c) .... 
Answer: No. 
The agent testified positively that each of these 
questions was read to Mr. Johnson and that to each 
separate question Mr. Johnson answered "No" (Tr. 37-
::39). The application was submitted to the underwriting 
department of the insurance company and no physical 
t~xamination was required. The application was approved 
and Policy No. WP2 510 001 was issued insuring Clyde 
W. Johnson. 
The testimony of K. E. Noyes, M.D., family physi-
cian of Clyde W. Johnson, was that in 1964 prior to the 
making of the application, Dr. Noyes had treated Mr. 
John son for heart failure; had advised the patient of 
his serious heart condition and had instructed him to 
"slow down" and to discontinue certain parts of his work. 
The significant particulars of Dr. Noyes' testimony are as 
follows: 
On March 16, 1964, Mr. Clyde Johnson saw Dr. 
Noyes with complaints of shortness of breath and swell-
ing of the ankles. The doctor took a history from Mr . 
. Johnson and examined him to diagnose his malady (Tr. 
fi). The doctor's notes show that the patient "has had 
rheumatic mitral valve lesions for many years" (Tr. 
27-28). Dr. Noyes' examination disclosed that he had a 
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heart rate of 100; that the patient's heart was enlarged; 
and that he had both systolic and diastolic murmers. The 
doctor concluded that he was suffering from double mitral 
valvular lesions and that the heart was "fibrillating" 
(Tr. 6-10). 
The doctor testified that the symptoms of shortness 
of breath and swelling of the ankles were typical and 
consistent with the other findings and that it was evi-
dent that Johnson was suffering from "heart failure" 
(Tr. 11-2). This diagnosis was further confirmed the 
following day, March 17, at which time the doctor per-
formed an electrocardiogram which clinically demon-
strated fibrilla~tion of the heart (Tr. 10-11). 
The doctor testified that Mr. Johnson knew that he 
had some problem with his heart for some time prior to 
the time he came into the doctor's office (Tr. 28). On 
the occasion of the first visit on March 16, 1964, the 
doctor told Mr .• Johnson that he was suffering from heart 
failure; that the condition would be treated with digitalis 
and that if "he would take it easy and not do the hard 
work he could get by" (Tr. 12). The condition of the 
mitral valve of the heart 'vhich was diagnosed was a 
condition which prevented this imrJortant valve of the 
heart from fully opening or closing. It was a chronic 
condition and could not be treated by medication and the 
only medical treatment which could be employed to cor-
rect the condition was heart surgery (Tr. 16). 
Digitalis was prescribed to slow the heart to a nor-
mal rate and to give the heart mnscle a rest and permit 
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it to build up strength. The initial prescription required 
.Johnson to take certain dosages of digitalis three times 
a day which the doctor described as strong dosages (Tr. 
14). Dr. Noyes saw Mr. Johnson on five separate occa-
sions in March of 1964. He testified that he talked with 
Mr. Johnson about surgery to correct the mitral valve 
problem. He testified that the first conversation about 
surgery was probably in March of 1964 (Tr. 15). 
Part of Dr. Noyes' deposition was published. This 
testimony was to the effect that during the visits in 
March, 1964, the doctor talked to Johnson about possibl<' 
surgery; that he indicated that ,Johnson had reached the 
time when he was getting symptoms; that "when your 
patient begins to get symptoms, that is the time to have 
surgery"; that "I told him to consider it"; and that 
when Johnson came in later on (in October of 1965) he 
said "he was ready for it" (Tr. 18-20). 
Following March of 1964, Dr. Noyes did not see Mr. 
J olmson again about his heart condition until October 
of 1 965 ·when Johnson came in again complaining of 
shortness of breath (Tr. 17). The insurance application 
had been made the month before. 
The doctor saw Mr. Johnson on two occasions m 
October and three occasions in November of 1965. The 
doctor's diagnosis during these visits remained the same 
and the patient was again treated with digitalis. In 
FPbruarv of 1966, Dr. Noyes referred Mr. Johnson to 
Dr. Roy. Kimball, a heart specialist in Salt Lake City. 
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Dr. Kimball associated Dr. Jensen and in March of 19G6 
' Mr. Johnson was admitted to a hospital in Salt Lake 
City for surgery to replace the mitral valve of the heart. 
Mr. Johnson died on March 30, 1966 following heart 
surgery. 
It was stipulated by the parties that if a Mr. vVil-
liam H. De Silva of the underwriting department of 
Prudential Insurance Company were called as a witness, 
he would testify that his department was charged with 
the responsibility of reviewing applications for insur-
ance and determining the insurability of applicants; that 
the company relied upon the representations of Mr. John-
son on the application that was submitted; that the 
company had no notice that Mr. Johnson had a heart 
condition and that if the company had known that Mr. 
Johnson had a heart condition or had known of Dr. 
Noyes' diagnosis or had known that Mr. Johnson had 
been treated with digitalis, that his application for in-
surance would have been rejected and that the policy 
would not have been issued. It was stipulated that the 
agreed testimony of Mr. De Silva be considered by the 
court as evidence (Tr. 62-64}. 
The trial court awarded judgment on defendant's 
counterclaim for the benefits claimed under the policy 
issued September 3, 1965 including life insurance and 
hnspital and medical benefits aggregating $6,506.79 plus 
interest. This appeal seeks reversal of the judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DE-
FENDANT. 
A. Plaintiff is entitled to cancellation of Policy No. 
W P2 510 001 for the reason that the issuance of thP: 
policy was induced by fraud and rnisrepresP:ntation 
of the insured, Clyde W. Johnson. 
The evidence, without conflict, discloses that on Sep-
tember 3, 1965, Clyde Johnson represented to Prudential 
Insurance Company in his application for insurance cov-
Prage that he had not been examined by or consulted a 
physician for a period of five years preceding the ex-
amination; that he had never been told that he had any 
trouble with his heart; that he had not been in any insti-
tution for observation, rest, diagnosis or treatment for 
five years preceding the application and that he had no 
knowledge of any physical impairment or ill health. 
Each of these statements was untrue. 
Mr. Johnson knew that his application was false. He 
had received extensive care for his heart condition the 
wry year before. At the very time the application was 
madP he was snff ering from a serious heart condition 
diagnosed as heart failure. He knew that it was in-
curable except by surgery; that he had taken digitalis 
nndPr the doctor's direction to control it; and that he 
had been told by the doctor that he must slow down and 
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discontinue strenuous work in his business. The company 
relied upon the application and the false representations 
of Johnson and was deceived thereby. 
The evidence as hereinabove recited, the uncon-
troverted facts as set forth in the pre-trial order (see 
particularly Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, R. 51-52 and the 
court's Findings of Fact, Paragraph 3, R. 57) conclu-
sively show that the policy was obtained by deceit. Upon 
the facts of this case, plaintiff is entitled as a matter of 
law to cancellation of the insurance policy issued on the 
fraudulent application. 
Chadwick vs. Brneficial Life Insitrance Company, 
54 Utah 443, 181 Pac. 448, also reported at 56 Utah 480, 
191 P. 240, is probahly the leading Utah case dealing with 
fraudulent insurance applications. In the Chadwick case, 
the applicant ans,vered questions on his application for 
insurance as follows: 
Have you ever had any of thl:' foll°'ving di-
seases .... rheumatism or gout~ 
Answer: No. 
Give name and address of physician last 
consulted. 
Answer: None. 
Are yon in good health, so far as you know 
or believe? 
Answer : Yes. 
At the time the application was made, the applicant 
was suffering from a condition which had been diagnosed 
as rhenmatism. The applicant's condition became pro-
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gressively worse after the policy was issued until his 
death a few months after the writing of the policy. An 
autopsy disclosed that he had died of tuberculosis of the 
spine. The Utah Supreme Court held that the policy 
was obtained by fraud and that intent to deceive was 
established as a matter of law. The reasoning of the 
court is reflected in the following quote from the main 
opinion: 
"If the insured at the time of making his appli-
cation for a policy has knowledge or good reason 
to know that he is afflicted with a disease that 
renders his condition serious, and that thereby 
his longevity will be prejudicially impaired, his 
statements and representations to the contrary 
in reply to specific inquiries constitute a fraud 
practiced upon the insurer, and which, when suc-
cessfully proven, invalidates the policy." 
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Frick stated: 
"\V"hile it is true that the deceased may not have 
appreciated the nature of his disease, he, as the 
undisputed evidence shows, did know that he was 
seriously afflicted with some malady, and that he 
had not only consulted doctors, but was being 
treated bY them therefor. The evidence thus 
stands un~ontradicted that the deceased did con-
ceal material facts from the defendant, and it is 
but fair, jnst, and right that the consequences ~f 
such concealment should fall upon the benefi-
ciaries of the insured rather than upon the de-
fendant, and indirectly upon the policy holders." 
. 'l'lw recent case of Thcros vs. 111 ctropolitan Life In-
sura nee company' 17 e tah 2d 205, 407 p. 2d 685, also 
deals with the issue of fraud in insurance applications. 
The insured had a history of past rheumatic heart a;sease 
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which he failed to disclose on the application for insur-
ance. The insurance company mowd for summary judg-
ment. The District Conrt granted the motion for sum-
mary judgment holding as a maitter of law that the 
policy was obtained by fraud and the Supreme Court 
aff;rmed. 
The beneficiaries of the policy contended that the 
insured gave truthful answers concerning his health and 
medical history; that the agent had incorrectly recorded 
the answers, and that the applicant had not read he 
applicaion before signing it. The Supreme Court held 
that the applicant was bound by the application which 
he signed whether he read it or not and that if he did 
not read it, he was at least bound by "constructive knowl-
edge" of the misrepresentations on the application which 
was submitted to the insurance company. In so holding, 
the court said: 
"In order to def eat recovenT on an insurance pol-
icy because of misrepresentation in the applica-
tion, the misrepresentations mnst have been made 
with an intent to deceive and defraud the insur-
ance company. However, such an intent may be 
inferred where the applicant knowingly misrepre-
sents facts which he knows would influence the 
insurer in accepting or rejecting the risk. Thr 
same rule should apply whne the ayiplicant know-
ingly, or with constructive knowledge, permits 
such misrepresentations to lw snhmitted to the 
insurance company ... 
* * * 
"It is also the majority rule that an insured is 
under a dutv to read his application before sign-
ing it and ~vill be considered hound by a know-
ledge 'of the contents of his signed application. 
-
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This is merely an application of fundamental con-
tract law. While courts generally are inclined to 
treat insurance contracts as special and do not 
always vigorously apply all the principles of con-
tract law, that tPndencv should not be allowed 
to overrun the bonnds ~f legitimate exception. 
"The facts here presented provide absolutely no 
basis for applying any exception to the basic con-
tract law. The record is devoid of any facts or 
circumstances that would indicate or imply that 
Theros was by fraud, accident, misrepresentation, 
imposition, illiteracy, artifice or device reason-
ably prevented from reading the application be-
fore signing it. Therefore, he is, by law, con-
clusively presumed to have read the application 
and his beneficiary is bound by the contents there-
of. It therefore follows that the lower court should 
be affirmed." 
Plaintiff is clearly entitled to cancel the policy 
issnPd on the 1965 application. 
B. The vrovis10ns of the policies is.med in 1957 and 
1960 do not preclude cancellation of the 1965 policy. 
(l) The 1965 policy is a contract entirely separate 
and indepPndPnt from the earlier contracts is-
sued in 1957 a1id 1960 and must be construed 
by its own terms. 
Each of the three policies issued to Johnson was a 
sPparate and independent contract of insurance. 
The 1957 policy ~was cancelled in 1960. When the 
1960 policy was issued there was certainly no question 
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that the coverage of the earlier policy had been termin-
ated. Had Mr. Johnson chosen to do so, he could have 
maintained the 1960 policy in full force and effect rather 
than obtain the benefits of the new coverao-e offered by 
b • 
the agent in 1965. The agent explained to Johnson when 
the 1965 application was made that the policy to be 
issued vvould be a "brand new" policy (Tr. 46-47). 
vVhen Johnson made the 1965 application, he had 
no life insurance coverage or major medical coveragl' 
with Prudential. This coverage was issued solely upon 
the basis of the false application. 
Each policy was issued on a separate written appli-
cation. Each policy provided different and distinct bene-
fits for a different premium charge. There is neither 
argument nor proof that any of the policies contained 
any provision for substitution or that the 1965 policy 
was issued b.Y reason of any right which Johnson had 
under either of the prior policies. 
vVe find absolutely no legal basis for the court's 
conclusion that the so-called "incontestable" provisions 
contained in the policies of 1957 and 1960 "carried over'' 
and became effective provisions of the policy issued in 
September of 1965. 
'Vhen the case was argued before the trial court, 
counsel for the defendant relied upon authorities dealing 
with "substituted policies" and instances where one in-
surer had assnm('d outstanding policies of another in-
surer. See 110 A.L.R. 1139, 10.J A.L.R. 997, 85 A.L.R. 240, 
29A Am .. J ur., R(•etion 1127 .. .:\ "substituted policy" is a 
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policy secured by the insured pursuant to a privilege 
granted to him by the original policy. None of these 
authorities even remotely sustain the defendant's con-
tention or the conclusion reached by the court in this 
case, because under the circumstances of this case, it is 
clear that each policy issued by the plaintiff was entirely 
separate and independent from each of the other policies. 
Furthermore, the 1965 policy provided new and addi-
tional coverage of an entirely different character. 
The 1965 policy must be construed upon the basis 
of its own terms and conditions. This is basic contract 
law. See e.g., Provident Life and Accident Insitrance 
Comzmny vs. Kegley, 99 S. E. 2d 601, and Nielsen vs. 
G<'neral American Life Insurance Company, 89 F.2d 90 
(10th Cir. 1937). No provision of the 1965 policy bars 
the plaintiff's action for cancellation of the policy or the 
assertion of a fraud defense. 
(2) The so-called "incontestable" provisions of the 
earlier policies do not by their terms preclude 
cancellation for fraudulent misstatements in 
the application. 
The provisions of the policies issued in 1957 and 
1960 which are relied upon by defendant provide as fol-
lows (R. 57): 
"Time Limit on Certain Defenses: (a) After two 
years from the date a person becomes covered 
~nder this Policy no misstatements, except fraud-
nlent misstatem~,;ds, made by the applicant in thP 
application for coverage of such person shall be 
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~sed to void the Policy or to deny a claim for loss 
mcurred after the expiration of such two year 
period. · 
(b) No claim for loss incurred with respect to anv 
person after two years from the date such perso~ 
becomes covered under this Policy shall be re-
duced or denied on the ground that a disease or 
physical condition not Pxcluded from coverage by 
name or specific description effective on the date 
of loss had existed prior to the effective date of 
coverage of such person." (Emphasis added.) 
The foregoing provisions of the policies are not 
incontestable clauses but rather "time limits" on certain 
def ens es. These same provisions are contained in the 
1965 policy (see Exhibit 1). The 1965 policy also con-
tains a one-year incontestable clause as to the life in-
surance coverage (see "Incontestability" paragraph of 
the policy provisions of Exhibit 1). The incontestability 
clause has no effect because the insured died within 
a period of one >-ear from the issuance of the policy. 
There was no incontestability clause in the earlier policy 
because it did not provide any life insurance coverage. 
It is at once apparent that as to the life insnrance 
and major medical coverage, there could be no possible 
merit to the claim that such rn~w cowrage would he 
harrf'd hy the provisions of any earlier policy since it was 
nPw coverage issued in reliance upon the false applica-
tion. 
W <' now turn to the so-called "incontestable" pro-
visions relied upon by the defendant which art- aetnall: 
just "time limits on ccrtni11 dt·fpnses." These provisions 
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do not bar the plaintiff's action for cancellation of the 
insurance policy. 
The "time limit" relates only to defenses and does 
not purport to prohibit cancellation of a policy procured 
by false and fraudulent representations. 
Paragraph (a) demolishes the defendant's argu-
ment because it expressly reserves plaintiff's right to de-
fend for "fraudulent misstatements made by the appli-
cant in the application for coverage." 
Paragraph (b) of the time limit relates to the scope 
of coverage and not to the right to def end or cancel 
for fraud. This paragraph by its terms is applicable to 
restrictions of coverage or defenses based upon the 
"existence" of a pre-existing physical condition and has 
no reference or application to an action to rescind for 
fraud or misrepresentation with respect to a known pre-
existing condition. 
Looking to the merit of the position that the pro-
visions in question constitue a bar to the plaintiff's action 
or a bar to the defense of the counterclaim, here are 
actually two questions involved: (1) do the provisions 
h.v their terms bar assertion of the frand7, and (2) when 
do the provisions become effective or, put another way, 
when does the time commence to run with respect to the 
two-,vear time limit? It is actually beside the point to 
say that the provisions of he earlier policies "carried 
01'er," because the 1965 policy contained the same pro-
visions. From what has been said, we think it is manifest 
that t>ven if the time limit was in effect, these provisions 
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do not bar the right of the, plaintiff to cancel the policy for 
fraud. The final answer to defendant's position however 
' ' is that there is no legal reason whatever why a time limit 
for the assertion of fraud should commence to rnn in 
1960 when the fraud was not committed until 1965. Such 
an analysis of the holding of the trial court brings into 
focus the manifest injustice of the judgment below. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy obtained by Johnson in 1965 was issued 
on the basis of his fraudulent application and plaintiff 
is entitled to cancel this policy. The policy is entirely 
independent of the policies previously written by the 
plaintiff and must be governed by its own terms and 
provisions. In any event, there is no provision in any of 
the policies which bars the plaintiff's action for cancella-
tion of the policies on the gronnd of fraud. The judgment 
of the trial court should be reversed and the court should 
be directed to enter judgment of cancellation in favor 
of the plaintiff dismissing defendant's counterclaim with 
prejudice and awarding plaintiff its costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT l\IACFARANE, JR. 
YAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 300, 141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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